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Abstract
Companies were required to disclose non-financial information other than financial
statements, due to the rapid and changing business conditions. This study aimed to
examine the impact of business strategy, corporate governance, and firm characteris-
tics on the risk disclosure. More specifically, we examined the impact of barriers to
entry, cost leadership, the board of commissioner size, ownership concentration, li-
quidity, industrial profile, and auditor type on risk disclosure. We used a sample
consisted of 96 observations for the period of 2008-2015 listed in Indonesian Stock
Exchange and PEFINDO 25. This research conducted using multiple regression analy-
sis methods to examine the factors influenced risk disclosure. This research also used
independent sample T-test to investigate the quality of risk disclosure before, and after
the implementation of IFRS in Indonesia, We found that barriers to entry, the board of
commissioner size, ownership concentration, industrial profile, and auditor type
significantly affect the risk disclosure. However, cost leadership and liquidity did not
have significant effects on the risk disclosure. Results of the study might provide a
sound contribution for further research, government, management of the company,
and investors regarding the risk disclosure practices.
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Abstrak
Perusahaan diminta untuk mengungkapkan informasi non-keuangan selain dari laporan
keuangan, karena kondisi bisnis yang cepat dan berubah. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji
dampak dari strategi bisnis, tata kelola perusahaan, dan karakteristik perusahaan terhadap
pengungkapan risiko. Lebih khusus lagi, kami memeriksa dampak hambatan untuk masuk,
cost leadership, ukuran dewan komisaris, konsentrasi kepemilikan, likuiditas, profil industri,
dan tipe auditor terhadap pengungkapan risiko. Kami menggunakan sampel yang terdiri dari
96 observasi untuk periode 2008-2015 yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia dan PEFINDO
25. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode analisis regresi berganda untuk
menguji faktor-faktor yang memengaruhi pengungkapan risiko. Penelitian ini juga
menggunakan independent sample T-test untuk menyelidiki kualitas pengungkapan risiko
sebelum dan sesudah implementasi IFRS di Indonesia. Kami menemukan bahwa hambatan
masuk, ukuran dewan komisaris, konsentrasi kepemilikan, profil industri, dan jenis auditor
berpengaruh secara signifikan terhadap pengungkapan risiko. Namun, cost leadership dan
likuiditas tidak memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan terhadap pengungkapan risiko. Hasil
penelitian dapat memberikan kontribusi yang kuat untuk penelitian lebih lanjut, pemerintah,
manajemen perusahaan, dan investor mengenai praktik pengungkapan risiko.
Kata kunci: Strategi Bisnis; Tata Kelola; Karakteristik Perusahaan; Pengungkapan Risiko
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In a turbulent, rapidly changing business condition,
companies are required to disclose non-financial
information aside from the financial statements.
Mokhtar & Mellett (2013) stated that companies are
encouraged not only to report their activities but
also to report the extent of firms’ risk and how well
they are capable of managing the risks. Agency
theory also maintained that in order to reduce in-
formation asymmetry, there is a strong demand to
report corporate risk among institutional investors
to improve portfolio investment decisions (Solomon
et al., 2000). Stakeholder theory also concurs with
the lemma that companies try to satisfy stakeholder
need by disclosing more information regarding the
company’s risks and the sustainability of its opera-
tion (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012).
Since companies are required to disclose the
risk information, a framework and regulations in
order to satisfy the accounting information user of
the global investor are needed. The framework will
ease financial analysts to understand the financial
reports under the same language (Cheong & Gould,
2012; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013) under the Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). As a re-
sult, in 2009, International Accounting Standards
Board issued an exposure draft for global report-
ing standard entitled IFRS.
Even though the regulation has been issued,
the disclosure of the company’s risk is still lacking
(Oliveira, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2011). Firms opt to
disclose risk information conservatively in order to
avoid negative consequences of such disclosure. As
a result, most companies are selective and only dis-
close a small brief and statements on their controls
environment and risk surrounded (Kendrick, 2000)
and led to lack of relevant information to satisfy
shareholders and stakeholders needs (Mokhtar &
Mellett, 2013). Interestingly, despite rare, the qual-
ity, and quantity of risk reporting disclosure are not
positively affected by the adoption of IFRS.
Management and other internal parties are the
parties that are responsible for identifying the risk
of the company. Therefore, it is common to assume
that management is in a better position to be aware
of the risk information, which leads to the emer-
gence of the information asymmetries between in-
ternal and external parties (Kravet & Muslu, 2013).
This asymmetry information can be reduced by
implementing sound and good corporate gover-
nance, while at the same time can also increase the
protection of stakeholders by minimizing opportunis-
tic behavior of managers (Siagian, Siregar, &
Rahardian, 2013). Therefore, strong corporate gover-
nance mechanism could lead to better risk disclosure.
On another vein, a company’s business strat-
egy also needs to be based on risk consideration.
Strategy and risk are strongly related because strat-
egy requires some level of risk-appetite since risk
affect both financial and non-financial performance
(Smart et al., 2015). The risk is generally associated
with bad news for the companies that force man-
agement to hold bad news to limit the shock to the
firms’ value (Rigoglioso, 2012; Elshandidy & Shrives,
2016). A sound business strategy will also provide
the companies with greater ability to manage the
risk information and thus will be more likely to dis-
close risk information (Porter, 1980).
Another factor that could lead to a better risk
disclosure is the company’s characteristics itself.
Company’s characteristics can be viewed from mul-
tiple angles, including financial, industrial, corpo-
rate culture, etc. Those characteristics might help to
account information used to assess the future risk
of the company (Campbell et al., 2014) while the
quality of this disclosure can make the company
looks desirable not just for the investor, but also to
the capital market regulators (Laidroo, 2009).
As previously mentioned, given there are sev-
eral factors of the reasons for a company to disclose
its risk profile, it is still not clear the determinants
of risk disclosure. Researches by Amran, Bin, &
Hassan (2009) and Oliveira, Rodrigues, & Craig
(2011) stated that firm size and industrial profile
are the main determinants of risk disclosure. How-
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ever, other researchers found differently. Studies
by Beretta & Bozzolan (2004), Amran, Bin, & Hassan
(2009), and Mokhtar & Mellett (2013) indicate that
there is a non-significant association between firm
size and risk disclosure. Meanwhile, Amran, Bin, &
Hassan (2009) and Mokhtar & Mellett (2013) research
results indicate that industrial profile has no impact
on risk disclosure.
This research tried to figure out the factors
that could influence the level of risk disclosure in
the company. It is important to identify the factors
that determine risk disclosure in the company’s an-
nual report (Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013) to understand
and better manage the companies’ risk. Hence, the
objectives of this research are to examine the influ-
ence of barriers to entry, cost leadership, the board
of commissioner, ownership concentration, liquid-
ity, industrial profile, and auditor type to the risk
disclosure. These variables are combined to be
tested for their effects on risk disclosure. This re-
search contributes to ways to manage firms’ risk
through multiple channels, including strategy, com-
petitive forces, governance mechanism, and firm as
well as industry-specific attributes.
This research contributes particularly on the
effect of the company’s strategy, corporate gover-
nance and firm characteristics on risk disclosure
study of the SMEs in Indonesia. Moreover, this re-
search could provide the government and regula-
tor on ways to manage the firm’s awareness of risk
and its disclosure. This study also contributes the
ways to encourage the management’s attention to
improve their ability in disclosing the risk.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Agency theory describes the relationship be-
tween the principal and the agent. However, the
agent is more likely to possess more information
than the principals which could be used to seek their
benefit (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which is called
information asymmetries. Agency theory also sug-
gests that companies can reduce information asym-
metries by assigning auditor (Kravet & Muslu, 2013).
However, according to Jensen & Meckling (1976)
and Buckby, Gallery, & Jiacheng (2015), auditor as-
signment lead to added agency cost to monitor the
agents’ actions. There is another way to reduce in-
formation asymmetries which is by risk disclosure.
Risk disclosure provides strong information regard-
ing the company’s situation and their risk manage-
ment which can decrease agency cost.
The second stream of theory in this study is
the attribution theory. According to attribution
theory, people tried to understand the event, the
people or the situation they had, and draw conclu-
sions (attribution) that may influence the situation
(Octaviani, Juwita, & Widagdo, 2015). The problem
occurs when people make a false attribution. Attri-
bution theory could explain the motive behind why
the shareholders tend to blame the director when
they cannot control risk, but disclose the good news
and take the credits when they can control the risk
(Anthony & Godwin, 2015).
Incumbent firms avoid new potential competi-
tors by creating a barrier for them to enter the in-
dustry. Existing firms usually create an expensive
cost of entry into a particular industry to prevent
potential competitors to enter (Barney & Hesterly,
2012). According to agency theory, in high situa-
tions of barriers to entry, incumbent firms tend to
disclose more information to prevent new potential
competitors compete with them in the industry be-
cause the new competitors cannot use that informa-
tion against them (Laidroo, 2009). Incumbent firms
tried to disclose information which more sensitive
but powerful to prevent new potential competitors.
Mokhtar & Mellett (2013) stated that in a high situ-
ation of barriers to entry, the incumbent firms might
provide sensitive information like risk disclosure.
Hence, the hypothesis is formulated:
H1: there is a significant positive relationship be-
tween barriers to entry and risk disclosure
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Cost leadership is part of a business strategy
which enables the company to be the cost-lowest
producer in a particular industry. Companies can
achieve cost efficiency and price reduction by effi-
cient and optimal resources allocation (Birjandi,
2014). Furthermore, a company that follows this
strategy is more likely to make a significant invest-
ment in the fixed asset to achieve economic scale
(Banker, Mashruwala, & Tripathy, 2014). The com-
pany which implements cost leadership strategy may
achieve superior contemporaneous performances
(Banker, Mashruwala, & Tripathy, 2014). Agency
theory predicts that companies with superior per-
formances tend to comply to disclose the risk and
their ability to reduce it because it will increase the
firm value and consequently, higher risk disclosure.
Therefore, the study hypothesis that:
H2: there is a significant positive relationship be-
tween cost leadership and risk disclosure
The effectiveness of corporate governance in
which determined by the board of commissioners
size. According to agency theory, the board of com-
missioners as the principal has an authority to moni-
tor the management actions to keep in line with the
stakeholder interest.
Managers can alter the risk information to
make their performances look good. Attribution
theory also indicates that managers are more will-
ing to make gimmicks to report bad news in a bet-
ter way. According to attribution theory, managers
tend to disclose bad news in a good way to reduce
its negative effects. A large board of commissioner
provides enough members for monitoring the man-
agement so that this situation is reduced. Moreover,
agency theory predicts that large board is more ef-
fective to monitor the management (Moumen,
Othman, & Hussaeny, 2016). Instead, few, although
the independent board of commissioners, large
board structure provide more room for the man-
agement to be motivated to disclose risk informa-
tion to the stakeholder so that they can decrease
the agency cost (Oliveira, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2011).
Accordingly, the hypothesis is tested:
H3: there is a significant positive relationship be-
tween the board of commissioners and risk
disclosure
Ownership of the companies may cause an
agency problem. Agency theory predicts that there
is a difference of interest and controls between the
agents and the principals due to the difference of
ownership which led to agency problem (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976).
Companies which have little ownership tend
to centralize the authority of the company. Compa-
nies with a high level of concentrated ownership
create a strong monitoring power from investors
over a company’s managerial decisions (Oliveira,
Rodrigues, & Craig, 2011). Hence, risk information
will not be disclosed in the annual report but board
meeting on a company with concentrated owner-
ship structures (Moumen, Othman, & Hussaeny,
2016).
Meanwhile, companies with a large number
of shareholder pushed the company to reduce
agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Moreover,
dispersed ownership more likely complies with the
mandatory risk disclosure (Mokhtar & Mellett,
2013). The following hypothesis is stated:
H4: there is a significant negative relationship be-
tween ownership concentration and risk dis-
closure
Liquidity is one of many indicators that can
indicate a company’s financial performance. Even
though there are numerous proxies for financial
performance, liquidity is chosen since it is able to
show the overall financial condition (Horne &
Wachowicz, 2008).
Therefore, companies are required to disclose
information regarding the liquidity risk (Taylor,
Tower, & Neilson, 2010), which is useful for the
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investor to assess the company’s situation for their
interest. Attribution theory predicts, in a high situ-
ation of liquidity, managers tend to disclose more
information to enhance their reputation and perfor-
mances (Brennan, 2010).
Moreover, a company with high liquidity is
likely to disclose more information regarding the
management of liquidity including the management
of liquidity risk (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Ac-
cording to the conditions above, the hypothesis is
formulated:
H5: there is a significant positive relationship be-
tween liquidity and risk disclosure
Different industries may have different
uniqueness and characteristics. Agency theory pre-
dicts different industry may face the different cost
of the agency because of the competition in the in-
dustry (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
There are several industries which are riskier
than other industries, and competition in this in-
dustry is higher than in other industries as well.
Therefore, it is expected that a company in a differ-
ent industry will experience different types of risk
(Amran, Bin, & Hassan, 2009). For example, the gas
and oil sectors may face a different risk than the
textile sectors. Different types of risk create differ-
ent activities and risk exposure (Elzahar &
Hussainey, 2012), which indicates that there will be
different information in the risk disclosure. Accord-
ing to the information provided above, the hypoth-
esis is stated:
H6: firms in the manufacturing industry are more
likely to disclose their risk profiles
Companies may hire an external employee to
monitor the management. As suggested by agency
theory, the company hires external sources or
known as external auditor to monitor management
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this research, big firms
refer to the top four auditing firms or known as Big
4.
Companies which hire Big 4 comply to man-
datory risk disclosure (Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013).
Good quality of auditor increase the quality of its
firm; and it is better for companies to hire auditing
firms with good qualities (Buckby, Gallery, &
Jiacheng, 2015). According to attribution theory, an
auditor is more likely to be falsified when they failed
to predict the occurrence of fraud or accounting ir-
regularities (Jaswadi, 2013). Big 4 have higher
knowledge about accounting standard IFRS, so they
tend to motivate the company to disclose more in-
formation to maintain the firms’ reputation and dis-
close firms’ risk attributes (Fukukawa & Kim, 2017).
Hence, the hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H7: there is a significant positive relationship be-
tween auditor type and risk disclosure
METHODS
The research sample of this research is com-
panies belong in the PEFINDO 25 INDEX from Au-
gust 2016 to January 2017. Furthermore, the research
objects are collected from the period of 2008-2015.
The selection of research objects is conducted using
the purposive sampling method with the following
criteria; company incorporated in the PEFINDO 25
INDEX for the period of August 2016 to January
2017, company publish annual report or financial
statement in 2008-2015, company use Indonesian
rupiah (IDR) in their financial statement, and the
research data is available in annual report and finan-
cial statement. PEFINDO was chosen as it is objec-
tively ranked the firms based on firm’s credit risk.
The dependent variable in this research is risk
disclosure. Risk disclosure is the information for
stakeholder regarding any opportunity, threat or
exposure, hazard, the danger that has impacted the
company or may impact the company in the future
(Kim & Yasuda, 2018). The locations of the informa-
tion of risks can be found in the notes to accounts
and the management reports. Adopting the previ-
ous research measurement from (Amran, Bin, &
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Hassan, 2009; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013), this re-
search uses an unweighted index. This research uses
the risk-disclosure index (MRRI) as developed by
Mokhtar & Mellett (2013). MRRI is used as it in-
cludes multiple dimensions of risk including risk
policies, financial as well as market risks. The MRRI
index is presented below:
Table 1. Mandatory Risk Disclosure Index
MRRIIJ = ∑ dijnj݅=1∑ dijmj݅=1  
 
(1)
Category Disclosure Items 
Risk Management 
Policies 
 
Description of financial risk management objectives 
Description of financial risk management policies 
An explanation of the extent to which financial instruments are used and the associated risks 
Terms, Conditions, 
and 
Accounting Policies 
 
 
For each class of financial asset, financial liability and equity instrument, disclose information 
about the extent and nature of the financial instruments, including significant terms and 
conditions that may affect the amount, timing and certainty of future cash flows 
Accounting policies and methods adopted including the criteria for recognition and the basis of 
measurement applied 
Interest Rate Risk 
Assets 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
Contractual repricing or maturity dates, whichever dates are earlier 
Effective interest rates 
 
Exposure to fair value interest rate risk, such as financial assets and financial liabilities with a fixed 
interest rate 
Exposure to cash flow interest rate risk, such as financial assets and financial liabilities with a 
floating interest rate that is reset as market rates change 
No direct exposure to interest rate risk, such as some investments in equity instruments 
 
Liabilities 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
Contractual repricing or maturity dates, whichever dates are earlier 
Effective interest rates 
Information about exposure to the effects of future changes in the prevailing level of interest rates 
Exposed to fair value interest rate risk, such as financial assets and financial liabilities with a fixed 
interest rate 
Exposed to cash flow interest rate risk, such as financial assets and financial liabilities with a 
floating interest rate that is reset as market rates change 
 
Credit Risk 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
The amount that best represents the maximum credit risk exposure at the balance sheet date in the 
event of other parties failing to perform their obligations under financial instruments 
Significant concentrations of credit risk 
Disclosure of concentrations of credit risk when they are not apparent from other disclosures 
about the nature of the business and financial positions 
A description of the shared characteristic that identifies each concentration 
The amount of the maximum credit risk exposure associated with all financial assets sharing that 
characteristic 
Liquidity Risk 
  
  
 
Analysis of assets into relevant maturity groupings based on the remaining period between the 
balance sheet date and the contractual maturity date 
Analysis of liabilities into relevant maturity groupings based on the remaining period between the 
balance sheet date and the contractual maturity date 
 
Foreign Currency 
Risk 
 
Gains minus losses that arise from dealing in foreign currencies 
The amount of significant net foreign currency exposures 
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Where:
dij : disclosure value of “i” item of information
required of “j” sample company. It is one (1)
if it is disclosed or zero (0) if it is not dis-
closed
mj : number of mandated information items ap-
plicable to, and are expected to be disclosed
by, the “j” sample company where mj = total
number of information items.
nj : number of mandated information items appli-
cable to and are disclosed by the j sample com-
pany
One of which the capital needed by the com-
pany is to incorporate sophisticated technology
which heavily requires investment on fixed assets
in order to generate revenues, dominating the mar-
ket and creating strong barriers to entry for new
potential competitors (Bragg, 2012). It is reasonable,
therefore, that the entry barrier is higher for an in-
dustry that requires a large investment on fixed as-
sets and/or capital expenditures.
In this research, the measurement of cost lead-
ership is identical to those used by Banker,
Mashruwala, & Tripathy (2014). Cost leadership is
measured using three different ratios as described
below and these measurements represent compa-
nies efficiency in utilizing the capital investment and
firm resources (Balsam, Fernando, & Tripathy,
2011). This research examines the cost leadership
uses the standard score for all the ratios below:
The size of the boards is determined by the
laws of the company, and it may consist of one or
more members according to the company needs and
preferences. The number of the board determines
the level of work efficiency among the board to
achieve the company’s goal. According to Law No.
40 the year 2007, the number of a board member
can change according to shareholder meetings.
Hence, the board of commissioner size measured
by the number of board members. Regarding the
ownership structure, this study measures it using
the percentage of ordinary shares held by substan-
tial shareholders.
Current study measures liquidity ratio into
two folds: the current ratio and liquidity ratio. In
current ratio, it uses inventory and another not so
liquid asset as the numerator. However, it is better
to use the most liquid asset as it is more critical and
reliable to check whether the companies can fulfill
their short-term liability or not (Horne &
Wachowicz, 2008). Therefore, this research use quick
asset ratio to measure liquidity, and the formula
ratio is expressed as follow:
 
ܰ݁ݐ ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ
ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ݁ݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁   (2) 
 
ܰ݁ݐ ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ
ܰ݁ݐ ܾ݋݋݇ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ݋݂ ݌݈ܽ݊ݐ ܽ݊݀ ݁ݍݑ݅݌݉݁݊ݐ 
 
 
 (3) 
ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݁ݏ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐ  
 
 
(4) 
Among the industry, there is more than one
sector which manufactures their product. The com-
pany which manufactures its product tend to have
sophisticated technology rather than another sec-
tor (Bragg, 2012). In other words, manufacturing
companies are more likely to use heavy equipment
to support their business. Consequently, firms in the
manufacturing industry tend to disclose more in-
formation than non-manufacturing industry (Rajab
& Schachler, 2009) to show firm compliance of their
safe use. Following the measurement by Mokhtar
& Mellet (2013) the industrial profile measured by a
dummy variable. The manufacturing sector is equiva-
lent as one (1), and the non-manufacturing sector is
equivalent as zero (0).
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ  ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ −ܫ݊ݒ݁݊ݐ݋ݎ݅݁ݏ
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ  ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏ (5)
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The high quality of auditing firms may increase
the quality of the company. Stakeholder feels more
secured if a reliable auditing firm handles the com-
pany because the quality of Big 4 is considered as
superior (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, & Zhang, 2011).
In Indonesia, most of the audit firm is affiliated with
the international auditing firm. However, only a few
of them affiliated with the Big 4. Therefore, auditor
type is measured using dummy variable in which
the auditing firm that affiliated with the Big 4 inter-
national auditing firm scored as one (1) and if the
auditing firm does not affiliate scored as zero (0).
This research is conducted using multiple re-
gression analysis methods to examine the factors
influenced risk disclosure. Multiple regressions in-
stead of panel data analysis are used since time year
variations are not much and unbalanced year domi-
nates the majority of the sample observation. This
research also uses independent sample T-test to in-
vestigate the quality of risk disclosure before and
after the implementation of IFRS in Indonesia. The
regression model is explained below.
Y = a + b1BE + b2CL + b3BS + b4OC + b5FL + b6IS
+ b7AT +   (6)
Where:
a : intercept
b : the slope of the regression line
Y : risk disclosure
BE : barriers to entry
CL : cost leadership
BS : board of commissioner size
OC : ownership concentration
FL : liquidity
IS : industrial profiles
AT : auditor type
e : error term
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics analysis is used to
define the research data from the mean, minimum,
maximum, and standard deviation value. The re-
search data which use dummy variable the data is
also defined by frequency and percentage.
Table 3. Frequency Distribution of Dummy Variables
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Risk Disclosure (%) 96 0.38 0.88 0.6822 0.11853 
Barriers Entry 96 13.18 16.72 15.2009 0.83545 
Cost Leadership 96 -1.41 1.44 -3.125E-07 0.44076 
Board Size 96 2.00 6.00 3.8750 1.17204 
Ownership Concentration (%) 96 38.77 99.74 68.0265 13.59444 
Liquidity (%) 96 0.10 4.38 1.1841 0.90939 
Industrial Profiles (dummy) 96 0.00 1.00 0.4167 0.49559 
Auditor Type (dummy) 96 0.00 1.00 0.5208 0.50219 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
 Ind Sector Audi Type 
 Scoring Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
 
0.00 46 47.9 56 58.3 
1.00 50 52.1 40 41.7 
Total 96 100.0 96 100.0 
 
Based on the descriptive statistics, risk dis-
closure has a mean value of 0.6822 with standard
deviation value 0.11853. The variable has a maxi-
mum value of 0.88 while the minimum value is 0.38.
This means, the company disclose risk information
minimum 38 percent and a maximum of 88 percent,
and have an average level of disclosure of 68.22
percent. Barriers to entry have a mean value of
15.2009 with the standard deviation value 0.83545.
The maximum value of this variable is 16.72,
while the minimum value is 13.18. The total of fixed
asset is transformed into log natural (LN) in order
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to be equal with other variables. Cost leadership
has a mean value -3.125E-07 or -0.0000003125 with
the standard deviation value of 0.44076.
The maximum value of this variable is 1.44
while the minimum value is -1.41. Board of com-
missioner size has a mean value of 3.8750 with stan-
dard deviation value 1.17204. The maximum value
of this variable is six while the minimum value is 2.
Ownership concentration has a mean value of 68.0265
with deviation standard 13.59444. The maximum
value of this variable is 99.74, while the minimum
value is 38.77. Liquidity has a mean value of 1.1841
with standard deviation value of 0.90939. The maxi-
mum value of this variable is 4.38, while the mini-
mum value is 0.10.
The industrial profile has a mean value 0.4167
with a standard deviation of 0.49559. Since this is a
dummy variable, the maximum value is 1, and the
minimum is 0. Table 4 provides data to see the com-
position in the dummy variable. The value of 0 on
this variable has 46 samples with a percentage of
47.9 percent, and the value 1 has 50 samples with a
percentage of 52.1 percent. In conclusion, there are
46 samples or 47.9 percent of the sample that is not
a manufacturing company, and there are 50 samples
or 52.1 percent of the sample which is a manufac-
turing company. Auditor type has a mean value of
0.5208 with a standard deviation of 0.50219. Since
this is a dummy variable, the maximum value is 1,
and the minimum is 0.
Table 4 provides data to see the composition
in the dummy variable. According to Table 4, score
0 has 56 samples with a percentage of 58.3 percent,
while score 1 has 40 samples with the percentage of
41.7 percent. Therefore, there are 56 samples or 58.3
percent of the samples hire the public auditing firm
that not affiliated with the Big 4 international au-
diting firm and there are 40 samples or 41.7 percent
of the samples hire the public auditing firm that af-
filiated with Big 4 international auditing firm.
Table 4 displays the results of hypotheses test-
ing including its supporting coefficients. Coefficient
of determination (R2) measures about how far the
set of independent variable could explain the de-
pendent variable (Ghozali, 2011) is 0.462, which
means that risk disclosure is explained 46.2 percent
by barriers to entry, cost leadership, board of com-
missioner size, ownership concentration, liquidity,
industrial profile, and auditor type.
Model 
Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
 
B Std. Error Beta    
(Constant) 0.200 0.187  1.069 0.288  
Barriers Entry 0.029 0.012 0.204 2.391 0.019 ** 
Cost Leadership 0.014 0.024 0.052 0.576 0.566  
Board Size 0.031 0.008 0.304 3.753 0.000 *** 
Owner Concentration -0.002 0.001 -0.183 -2.115 0.037 ** 
Liquidity -0.016 0.012 -0.126 -1.412 0.161  
Industrial Profiles 0.067  0.021 0.278 3.106 0.003 ** 
Audi Type 0.044 0.020 0.186 2.208 0.030 ** 
R2: 0.501; 0.462; Adj R2; F Stat: 12.640; F-sig: 0.000; Durbin Watson d: 2.077 
 
Table 4. The t Distribution Test Result
R2: 0.501; 0.462; Adj R2; F Stat: 12.640; F-sig: 0.000; Durbin Watson d: 2.077
Dependent Variable: Risk Disclosure
Significance at *0.10, **0.50, and *** 0.01 levels
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan | FINANCE
Volume 22, Issue 3, July 2018: 381–394
| 390 |
Additional Analysis
As previously stated, this research uses inde-
pendent sample T-test to investigate the quality of
risk disclosure before and after the implementation
of IFRS in Indonesia. The independent samples t-
test is used to determine whether two independent
groups have a significant difference of mean popu-
lation statistically. If the significance value is less
than 0.05 (sig < 0.05) indicates that there is a differ-
ence in risk reporting between the pre-IFRS condi-
tion and post-IFRS condition. The result of the test
is presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Test of Risk Disclosure Changes Due to IFRS
age level of risk disclosure after the implementa-
tion of IFRS is higher than before the implementa-
tion. According to Cheong & Gould (2012), the prin-
cipal base of IFRS encourages companies for better
accounting information that leads to better trans-
parency.
DISCUSSION
Partially, we found that barriers to entry have
a positive coefficient value 0.024 and the significant
value is 0.024 which is less than the probability value
0.05. It means that the barriers to entry have a posi-
tive relationship to the risk disclosure and the hy-
pothesis is accepted. It means that in a high situa-
tion of barriers to entry, the company tends to dis-
close more information (Laidroo, 2009), in order to
draw more attention from new stakeholder which
led them to be ahead of its potential competitors
listed in PEFINDO 25 index. Nevertheless, the find-
ings are inconsistent with ones found by Mokhtar
& Mellett (2013).
Cost leadership has a positive coefficient value
0.024, and the significant value is 0.852, which is
greater than the probability value 0.05. It means that
variable cost leadership has a positive relationship
to the risk disclosure and the hypothesis is rejected.
The possible explanation is that companies which
following different business strategy are also moti-
vated to disclose risk information because of the
competition in the market. As firms in cost leader-
ship strategy are facing stronger competition,
Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) maintained that compe-
tition could be anticipated by profiling and manag-
ing company’s risk.
IFRS N Mean Std.  Deviation 
Std.  
Error Mean 
Pre 28 0.61071 0.134768 0.025469 
Post 68 0.71162 0.097913 0.011874 
 
 Levene's Test for Equality  
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
 F Sig. T Df Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
Equal Variances Assumed 6.461 0.013 -4.094 94 0.000 
Equal Variances Not Assumed   -3.591 39.265 0.001 
 
Table 6. Independent Samples Test
According to Table 5 and Table 6, the num-
ber of the sample on pre-IFRS is 28 samples, while
the post-IFRS has 68 samples. It means only 28 com-
panies can be used to determine the quality of risk
disclosure before the implementation of IFRS and
68 companies are used to determine the level of risk
disclosure after the implementation of IFRS. The
difference is caused by the lack of data in the
company’s annual report. The significance value is
0.000 and 0.001. The result found that there is a dif-
ference in risk reporting between the condition of
pre-IFRS and post-IFRS.
The mean value of pre-IFRS is 0.61071 with
the standard deviation value of 0.134768. The post-
IFRS has a mean value of 0.71162 with standard
deviation value of 0.097913. It means that the aver-
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Board size or board of commissioner size has
a positive coefficient value 0.031, and the signifi-
cant value is 0.000 which is less than the probability
value of 0.05. It means that the board of commis-
sioner size has a positive relationship to the risk
disclosure and the hypothesis is accepted. It means
that a large number of board of commissioner is
more effective to monitor the management
(Moumen, Othman, & Hussaeny, 2016). Moreover,
a large number board of commissioner size is more
aware of risk disclosure (Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013).
The result of this hypothesis is consistent with
Mokhtar & Mellett (2013) but inconsistent with
Elzahar & Hussainey (2012).
Ownership concentration has a negative co-
efficient value of -0.002 and the significant value of
0.037, which is less than 0.05. It means that owner-
ship concentration has a negative relationship to the
risk disclosure and the hypothesis is accepted. It
means that company which concentrated the own-
ership tends to disclose less risk information. Mean-
while, widely held of ownership concentration have
a larger number of investor, so that it might be dif-
ficult to create a group and dominate the company
in order to control the disclosure of risk informa-
tion on behalf of their interest (Kravet & Muslu,
2013). The result is consistent with the previous re-
search that is Mokhtar & Mellet (2013) but inconsis-
tent with Oliveira, Rodrigues, & Craig (2011).
Liquidity has a negative coefficient value that
is -0.016 and the significant value of this variable
are 0.161, which is greater than the probability value
that is 0.05. It means that liquidity has a negative,
despite no significant relationship to the risk dis-
closure and the hypothesis is rejected. The possible
explanation is because liquidity is only considered
as key indicators for the company’s financial per-
formances but not for the risk disclosure (Ruwita &
Harto, 2013). This research result is consistent with
Rajab & Schachler (2009), Elhazar & Hussainey
(2012), and Mokhtar & Mellett (2013).
The industrial profile has a positive coefficient
value 0.067, and the significant value is 0.003 which
is less than the probability value of 0.05. It means
that the industrial profile has a positive relation-
ship to the risk disclosure and the hypothesis is ac-
cepted. This result indicates that manufacture com-
panies tend to disclose more information than non-
manufacture companies. Manufacture companies
have a more sophisticated asset, and some of them
are classified as a heavy asset. Heavy-industry is
motivated to disclose more information (Rajab &
Schachler, 2009). The result is consistent with Hassan
(2009), Rajab & Schachler (2009), and Oliveira,
Rodrigues, Lima, & Craig (2011).
Auditor type has a positive coefficient value
0.044, and the significant value is 0.030 which is less
than 0.05. It means that auditor type has a positive
relationship to the risk disclosure and the hypoth-
esis is accepted. The result means that a company
which hires an auditing firm that affiliated with the
big four international auditing firm tend to disclose
more risk information. Big 4 tend to motivate the
company to disclose more information (Fukukawa
& Kim, 2017), to maintain their image and reputa-
tion. The result is consistent with Oliveira,
Rodrigues, & Craig (2011) and Mokhtar & Mellett
(2013).
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
This research found that the level of risk dis-
closure is influenced by barriers to entry, the board
of commissioner size, ownership concentration, in-
dustrial profile, and auditor type. We also found
that risk reporting is higher in the post-IFRS con-
vergence period as compared to the pre-IFRS pe-
riod. Current research has some practical and policy
implications that are worth noting. First, regulator
and government can assure that risk disclosure can
be enhanced by sustaining the smooth business en-
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vironment and stronger and sound corporate gov-
ernance mechanism. Second, regulators may also
encourage auditing firms to promote the needs for
proper and adequate risk management among the
firms.
Suggestions
This research has some limitations and weak-
nesses. First, this research only focused on a small
and medium enterprise which incorporated in
PEFINDO 25 Index.
Next, the sample size is not equal among the
period. Third, there is no difference for companies
who disclose brief or long risk information. As long
as the companies explain information of the required
disclosure by the index, it is considered as disclos-
ing risk information, and they get scored 1. Fourth,
there is no previous research which can support the
result of hypothesis number two. Due to the low
sampling period, the use of multiple regressions in-
stead of panel data analysis also brings about fur-
ther limitation.
Regardless of the limitations of this research,
some suggestions are provided for future research-
ers in order to have a better exploration of this re-
search topic. First, future research may include an-
other small and medium enterprise out from the
PEFINDO 25 Index, may have an equal data among
the sample period, may differentiate the companies
which give a brief or long explanation as a different
disclosure of the risk, may use this research or an-
other research to support the future result, research
may conduct research among different countries,
and may conduct the research with the consider-
ation to use primary data.
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